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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we estimate the effect of the tax preference for health insurance on health care spending
using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys from 1996-2005.  We use the fact that Social
Security taxes are only levied on earnings below a statutory threshold to identify the impact of the
tax preference.  Because employer-sponsored health insurance premiums are excluded from Social
Security payroll taxes, workers who earn just below the Social Security tax threshold receive a larger
tax preference for health insurance than workers who earn just above it.  We find a significant effect
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The tax preference for employer-sponsored health insurance, under which 
employer contributions to employee health insurance are deductible to the employer and 
non-taxable to the employee, is perhaps the most salient feature of postwar health policy 
in the United States.   By making insured health spending appear less costly than it is, the 
tax preference gives employees the incentive to take compensation as health insurance 
rather than cash.  This incentive has had two main effects.  First, it has increased 
insurance coverage, particularly coverage through employers (see Jonathan Gruber, 2002, 
for a review of work identifying this effect).  Second, it has distorted the quantity and 
type of health insurance that people choose in a manner that has increased health 
spending.   At the most basic level, the tax preference increases demand for health 
services by reducing their price relative to other goods and services.  The tax preference 
also induces people to channel their spending on health services through insurance rather 
than spend out of pocket.  This tax bias favoring the purchase of health insurance leads 
people to choose health plans with lower deductibles and coinsurance rates, which in turn 
further increases spending because of the moral hazard inherent in health insurance.
1  
Although economists differ about the consequences for social welfare of the effect of the 
tax preference on coverage, virtually all since Martin Feldstein's (1973) seminal article 
have agreed that the overspending on health care induced by the tax preference has 
contributed to the inefficiency of the U.S. health system.   
                                                 
1 Even though individuals' health plan choices are mediated through employers, there are several reasons to 
expect a link between an individual's tax rate and his plan's generosity.  First, most individuals with 
employer-sponsored health insurance are offered a choice of health plan.  According to the Kaiser Family 
Foundation/Health Research and Educational Trust (2005), 67 percent of workers in 1996 and 63 percent in 
2005 could choose from at least two plans.  Second, even employers that offer only one plan choose its 
parameters based on their workers' preferences.  In particular, M. Kate Bundorf (2002) shows that worker 
characteristics, including income (and therefore tax rate), are statistically significant determinants of plan 
generosity.   3
Assessments of the magnitude of the effect of the tax preference on health 
spending have therefore been at the center of health policy debates for more than 30 
years.  Yet, for two reasons, few studies have convincingly identified the size of this 
effect.  First, because tax rates depend on income, and income and health spending are 
jointly determined outcomes of an incompletely observable process, disentangling the 
effect of the tax preference from other, unobserved determinants of income is difficult.  
Second, because researchers only observe imperfectly measured proxies for the true post-
tax price for insurance, simple regression estimates of the effect of the tax preference are 
biased toward zero.   
In this paper, we use the fact that Social Security taxes are only levied on earnings 
below a statutory threshold to identify the tax preference’s impact.  Because employer-
sponsored health insurance premiums are excluded from Social Security payroll taxes, 
workers who earn just below the Social Security tax threshold receive a larger tax 
preference for health insurance than workers who earn just above it.  By comparing 
health care spending of individuals in families with workers just above the payroll tax 
threshold with that of individuals in families with workers who are just below it, we can 
identify the effect of the tax preference for insurance.   
Using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys Household Component 
(MEPS-HC) from 1996-2005, we estimate a significant impact of the tax preference for 
insurance on health spending, consistent with results in the previous literature.  The paper 
proceeds in the next five sections.  Section II reviews previous work concerned with 
estimating the effect of tax policy on health spending and describes our methodological 
approach.  Section III discusses the data we use for our analysis, and presents tabular   4
results which show evidence of a large impact of the Social Security payroll tax on health 
care spending.  People in families with a holder of employer-sponsored insurance who 
earns just above the tax threshold spend 24 percent less than people in families with an 
employer-sponsored-insurance policyholder who earns just below the tax threshold.  
Section IV imbeds the payroll tax in a more general framework for analyzing the impact 
of tax policy on health care spending and provides an estimate of the tax preference’s 
effect.   Section V uses data from the Community Tracking Study from 1996-1998 to 
investigate the mechanism through which this effect occurs.  We find that holders of 
employer-sponsored health insurance who earn just above the tax threshold have lower 
premiums, and thus presumably less extensive health insurance coverage,  than those who 
earn just below it.  Section VI makes some concluding observations. 
 
II.  EFFECTS OF TAX PREFERENCES ON HEALTH SPENDING:  PREVIOUS 
RESEARCH  
As Mark Pauly's (1986) classic review highlights, conventional estimates of the 
effects of tax policy on health spending suffer from two sources of potential bias.  First, 
because marginal tax rates rise with income, and individuals’ incomes and health 
spending are jointly determined by an endogenous process, simple regression estimates of 
the effect of the tax rate on spending are in general biased and inconsistent.  Second, 
because researchers only observe proxies for the after-tax price of insurance, and these 
proxies measure the true after-tax price with error, estimates of the effect of the tax rate 
are biased toward zero.  As Pauly points out, these problems are of more than theoretical 
concern.   The wide range of early estimates of the elasticity reported by Pauly, -0.14 to -  5
1.9, reflect the failure of traditional approaches to deal robustly with these sources of 
bias.   
More recent research has taken two novel approaches to address this shortcoming.  
One arm of this research uses theoretical models to simulate the effects of tax policy 
based on existing empirical estimates of the price elasticity of demand for health 
services.
2  William Jack and Louise Sheiner (1997) use this parameter as an input to a 
theoretical model in which consumers choose insurance contracts and then face random 
health shocks.  They calculate how much health spending would be reduced by repeal of 
the tax preference under various assumptions about individuals' coefficient of relative 
risk aversion.  They also propose conditions under which extending the tax preference to 
out-of-pocket spending can actually reduce health spending.
3  Jonathan Gruber (2002) 
uses a simulation model that highlights the role of firms' offering decisions to show how 
spending and employer coverage would change in response to complete and partial repeal 
of the tax preference.  John Cogan, Glenn Hubbard, and Daniel Kessler (2011) show that 
the effect of the tax preference for insurance on health spending can be written as the 
product of two parameters:  the price elasticity of demand for health services, and the 
                                                 
2The most comprehensive study of the elasticity of demand for health services remains the RAND Health 
Insurance Experiment, which found that a one percent increase in the out-of-pocket price led to a 0.2 
percent decline in spending (Willard Manning, et al., 1987; Joseph Newhouse, 1993).   In a more recent 
study using observational data, Matthew Eichner (1998) found that a one percent increase in the price led to 
approximately a 0.7 percent decline in spending.  
3 Expanding deductibility has two opposing effects on health care spending. First, it lowers the overall price 
of health care relative to other goods and services, thereby increasing health care spending. Second, it raises 
the price of purchasing health care through insurance relative to out-of-pocket. The second effect induces 
people to shift to health plans with higher deductibles and coinsurance rates which, in turn, lowers health 
care spending.  Because the base of out-of-pocket spending is so much smaller than that of insured 
spending, the net change in the overall price of health care from expanding deductibility is much smaller 
than the change in the relative price of out-of-pocket versus insured care. This fact leads the second effect 
to dominate the first and, in turn, leads to a net decrease in spending.   6
effect of the tax preference on the coinsurance rate.
 4  They use the simulation results 
from Jack and Sheiner (1997) and Martin Feldstein and Bernard Friedman (1977), along 
with empirical estimates of the price elasticity of demand, to provide a range of estimates 
of the effect of repealing the tax preference.   
A second arm of this research seeks to identify the effects of tax policy 
empirically using arguably exogenous variation in the tax rate.
5  Jonathan Gruber and 
Michael Lettau (2004) estimate the effect of the tax preference using simulated tax rates 
as instruments for people's actual tax rates, where the simulated tax rates are functions 
only of interactions between state, year, and an individual's decile in the earnings 
distribution.  They find an elasticity of firm-level insurance spending with respect to the 
after-tax price of -0.7.  Michael Smart and Mark Stabile (2005) examine the 
consequences of the Canadian Medical Expense Tax Credit (CMETC), which allows 
taxpayers to claim a credit for 17 percent of medical expenses in excess of $1,637 (2000 
tax year) or 3 percent of net income, whichever is smaller.  Qualifying expenses include 
both insurance premiums and out-of-pocket spending on hospital and physician services, 
prescription drugs, and long-term care.  Using discontinuities in the CMETC formula, 
and variations in the effective formula across provinces and over time, they find moderate 
to large tax-price elasticities of demand for health services, between -0.7 and  -1.0.   
Each of these studies has important limitations.  The consistency of Gruber and 
Lettau's (2004) estimates depend on the validity of their assumption that interactions 
                                                 
4 For simplicity, we use the term "coinsurance rate" to refer to all cost-sharing -- that is, payments made 
under an insurance policy's deductible and its copayment schedule.  
5 A related set of studies examine the effect of tax policy on firms' decision to offer insurance, employees 
decision to take up insurance, and insurance plan choice (Jonathan Gruber and Ebonya Washington, 2005; 
William Jack, Arik Levinson, and Sjamsu Rahardja, 2006).  These studies find small elasticities of offer 
and takeup, but larger elasticities of plan choice, with respect to the tax preference.   7
between state tax progressivity and individuals' incomes are uncorrelated with 
individuals' taste for health insurance or medical care.  Smart and Stabile's approach 
requires a similar assumption, and in any event may not be applicable to the effect of the 
tax preference on health spending in the United States.   On the one hand, the CMETC 
only applies to spending on products and services that are not already covered by publicly 
financed basic provincial health insurance.   Because uncovered services may be more 
discretionary in nature, their elasticity of spending may be larger than the elasticity of 
spending on all health care.  On the other hand, the CMETC applies to both insured and 
out-of-pocket spending, while the tax preference in the U.S. applies only to insured 
spending.  Thus, the U.S. tax preference would tend to induce people to shift to health 
insurance plans with less coinsurance, whereas the CMETC would not.
6  This effect, in 
turn, would increase moral hazard and increase health spending, which implies that the 
elasticity of spending with respect to the CMETC would be smaller than the elasticity of 
spending with respect to a tax preference for insurance.   
As Gruber and Lettau (2004) point out, their estimated elasticities, as well as 
those of Smart and Stabile (2005), imply that repeal of the tax preference would lead to 
very large reductions in spending on employer-sponsored insurance.  Accurate 
assessment of the effect of the tax preference is therefore a critical tax policy issue.  In 
this paper, we offer an alternative strategy for identifying the effect of interest.  We use 
the fact the Social Security program limits the annual amount of wage earnings that are 
subject to Social Security payroll taxation.  Under the Social Security program, 
employers and employees each pay a 6.2 percent payroll tax on earnings below the 
                                                 
6 Smart and Stabile show that, in practice, the CMETC does not affect the demand for insurance on the 
intensive margin.   8
maximum taxable wage (the "wage base").  The wage base is set by law and is 
automatically adjusted each year by the average growth in Social-Security covered 
wages.  (Table 1 reports the wage base for each of our sample years 1996-2005.)  For 
workers who earn below the wage base, earnings are subject to Social Security payroll 
taxes while employer-sponsored health insurance premiums are not; above the wage base, 
neither earnings nor premiums are subject to tax..  
This differential tax treatment of earnings creates a differential tax preference for 
insurance.  Following Gruber and Lettau (2004), we specify the tax price of insurance, 
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In principle, by comparing health care spending of individuals in families with a 
employer-sponsored insurance policyholder who earns just below the maximum taxable 
wage to spending by individuals with a policyholder who earns just above this threshold, 
we can identify the impact of the tax preference on health care spending. 
                                                 
7 We compute the marginal federal tax rate by assuming each family takes the standard deduction.  We 
cannot compute the state tax rates because the MEPS does not have information on the state of residence.   9
III.  DATA 
We use data from the MEPS-HC from 1996-2005.  The MEPS-HC collects data 
from a sample of families and individuals that is drawn from a nationally representative 
subsample of households that participate in the National Health Interview Survey.  The 
panel design of the MEPS seeks to collect information on each individual in the sample 
for two full calendar years.   In particular, the MEPS-HC collects the amount of spending 
on health care services, wage earnings, and various demographic and economic 
information.  The MEPS-HC (through the person-round-plan file) also links each 
individual with employer-sponsored health insurance to the worker who holds the policy 
that is the source of coverage.  We limit our main analysis to individuals covered all year 
through the same full-year worker who holds a full-year employer-sponsored health 
insurance policy.  Since in any given year only about 15 percent of all workers have 
earnings that exceed Social Security’s maximum taxable wage, our sample pools together 
ten years of annual MEPS samples to obtain as many observations on high-wage workers 
as possible.   
 
A.  Results Using Sample Means 
  Because health care is a normal good, we expect, all else held constant, that health 
care spending would rise with wages. But if the tax preference provided by the Social 
Security payroll tax significantly affects health care spending, its impact should be 
manifested in lower health care spending among individuals in families in which the 
policyholder earns just above the payroll tax threshold relative to individuals in families 
in which the policyholder earns just below the threshold.  Thus, if we array individuals   10
according to the earnings of their family's policyholder, we would expect to observe a 
monotonic relationship between earnings and health care spending across the earnings 
spectrum, except around the Social Security payroll tax threshold. 
Table 2 groups individuals in the 1996-2005 pooled MEPS by the earnings of 
their family's policyholder, expressed as a percentage of the Social Security wage base in 
their sample year.  The table reports the average health care spending level (in constant 
2004 dollars, deflated with the CPI) of all individuals within each wage interval.  As the 
table shows, health care spending generally rises with the earnings level of the family’s 
policyholder.  Individuals in families with a policyholder earning less than 70 percent of 
the Social Security wage base spend on average $1,953 per year in 2004 dollars.  As the 
wage and salary income of a family's policyholder increases, so does each member's 
health spending, up to 90-100 percent of the wage base ($2,406 per year).   
However, individuals in families with a policyholder earning 100-110 percent of 
the wage base spend 23.7 percent less on average -- $1,836 per year -- than their 
counterparts in families with a policyholder earning 90-100 percent of the wage base.  
Given that the tax price of health insurance rises from 0.597 below to 0.692 above the 
wage base (see Table 3), this implies a raw elasticity of -1.823,
8 which is highly 
suggestive of a large impact of the payroll tax preference on health care spending.  The 
fact that as the wage and salary income of a family's policyholder increases beyond 100-
110 percent of the wage base, health spending begins rising again, to $2,110 for persons 
in families in which the policyholder earns more than 130 percent of the taxable 
threshold, lends further support to the hypothesis that the drop in health care spending 
just above the Social Security tax threshold is the result of the tax preference.   
                                                 
8 -1.823 = [(1836 - 2406) / (0.5*(1836 + 2406))] / [(0.692 - 0.597) / (0.5*(0.692 + 0.597))].   11
Table 3 shows that differences in the characteristics of individuals and families 
are unlikely to account for the differences in spending.  The table compares the 
characteristics from families in which the policyholder earns 90-100 percent of the Social 
Security taxable wage threshold to the characteristics from families in which the 
policyholder earns 100-110 percent of the threshold.   As the table shows, the 
characteristics are quite similar, except for their tax price of insurance.  Individuals in the 
higher-income group come from families with only slightly more educated policyholders 
(15.3 years, as opposed to 15.1 years).  The occupation, industry, age, gender, and marital 
status distributions show no systematic differences that would explain the observed 
differences in health care spending between the two groups. 
The total income of families whose policyholder earns just below the taxable 
earnings threshold is 8.0 percent ($8,130) lower than family incomes whose policyholder 
earns just above the threshold.  This difference is not surprising, but, importantly, rules 
out the likelihood that higher family incomes among families in the lower wage group 
generated by non-wage sources or other family member earnings explain their higher 
health care spending levels. 
Figure 1 presents two breakdowns of the difference in spending between 
individuals in families with a policyholder just above and just below the Social Security 
tax threshold.  The top panel of the figure shows that individuals in families in which a 
policyholder earns 90-100 percent of the wage base spend more on both inpatient and 
outpatient services (although not on outpatient dental and vision services, which are 
traditionally not covered by insurance) than individuals in families with a policyholder 
earning 100-110 percent of the wage base.  The bottom panel shows average spending by   12
wage income quintile, again for individuals in families with a policyholder earning 90-
100 versus 100-110 percent of the wage base.   It shows that spending is higher in every 
quintile among those below versus above the wage base, statistically significantly higher 
for quintiles 1, 3, 4, and 5 (p < 0.01 for quintiles 1, 3, and 5, p = 0.03 for quintile 4).  The 
difference in spending is most pronounced among individuals in the top quintile:  those 
just below the wage base spent $8,973 on average as compared to those just above the 
wage base, who spent $6,442. 
 
IV.  ESTIMATING THE LINK BETWEEN TAX PREFERENCES AND HEALTH 
SPENDING  
  Although these results are suggestive, they do not formally control for differences 
in individuals and families that may affect both tax rates and health spending. To do so, 
we specify a model of the health spending of individuals i = 1,…, N covered by full-year 
employer-sponsored health insurance in year t.  Each individual is a member of a family j 
= 1,…, J that consists of a policyholder who works outside the home for wages or salary, 
and that person's spouse and/or children, if s/he has them.  An individual has 
characteristics Xijt that include age, age squared, gender, and marital status.  A family has 
characteristics Zjt that include the number of covered family members and the educational 
attainment, occupation, and industry of the policyholder.   Educational attainment is an 
indicator variable denoting whether the policyholder is a college graduate; occupation is 
an indicator variable for whether the policyholder is a professional or technical worker 
(all other occupations are the omitted group); industry is a series of indicator variables for 
whether the policyholder is employed in agriculture or mining, construction,   13
manufacturing, financial and business services, or public administration (all other 
industries are the omitted group).  Finally, we characterize each family by its total income 
Yjt and the wage and salary income of its policyholder Wjt. 
 
A.  Models 
Our models specify health spending Hijt as a function of the characteristics of 
individuals and families, Xijt and Zjt; a function of family income and the wage and salary 
of the family's policyholder, g(Yjt,Wjt); the tax price of insurance TPjt; a family-specific 
error term ηj;
9 and an individual-specific error term εijt:   
(1) H ijt = θt + λTPjt + Xijtβ + Zjtγ + g(Yjt,Wjt) + ηj + εijt          
For the reasons discussed above, simple OLS estimates of (1) are likely to be 
inconsistent.  For example, because TPjt  implicitly depends on Yjt and Wjt, any 
misspecification of g(Yjt,Wjt) would mean that TPjt would be correlated with either ηjt and 
εijt or both.  We therefore estimate (1) by instrumental variables, using ABOVEjt
  as an 
instrument, where ABOVEjt
  = 1 if the wage and salary income of the policyholder is 
greater than 100 percent of the wage base.   
We estimate our model in both levels and logs.  When we specify the model in 
levels, we assume that g(.) is a cubic function of household income and the wage and 
salary income of the policyholder:  
g(Yjt,Wjt) = π1Yjt + π2Yjt
2 + π3Yjt
3 + ρ1ωjt
  + ρ2ω3jt




 = is the wage and salary income of the policyholder, expressed as a percentage 
of the wage base.   This specification is the simplest one for a "fuzzy" regression 
                                                 
9 This specification of the error structure allows unobserved determinants of health spending to be 
arbitrarily correlated both within families and over time.   14
discontinuity model, as described by Angrist and Pischke (2009).  In log form, (1) 
becomes: 
(2) ln(Hijt) = θt + λlnTPjt + Xijtβ + Zjtγ + g(Yjt,Wjt) + ηt + εijt 
where g(.) is a log function of household income: 
g(Yjt,Wjt) = π1ln(Yjt) + ρ1ωjt
  + ρ2ωjt




B.  Results 
Table 4 presents OLS and instrumental variables estimates of the effect of the tax 
preference for insurance on health spending from (1) and (2).  The OLS estimates from  
(1) and (2) (in columns (1) and (2)) suggest that the tax price of insurance has a small and 
statistically insignificant effect on spending on health services by individuals in families 
with full-year employer coverage.  The IV estimates (in columns (3) and (4)), in contrast, 
show that decreases in the tax price (i.e., increases in the tax preference) increase 
spending.  At the average level of health spending and the average tax rate, the IV 
estimate in column (3) translates into an elasticity of -0.601.  This estimate is slightly 
smaller (in absolute value) than the elasticity of -0.741 from the log specification in 
column (4).  The elasticity from the linear model is statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 10 percent level; the elasticity from the log model is statistically different 
from zero at the 5 percent level.   Hausman tests reject the consistency of the OLS 
estimates of both (1) and (2) at the 5 percent level (for the linear model, p = 0.01; for the 
log model, p = 0.04), suggesting that endogeneity of TP is a practical as well as 
theoretical concern.   15
Table 5 presents results from six alternative specifications of (2) to investigate the 
robustness of our main result.  Column (1) of the table repeats the estimates from the log 
model in Table 4, column (4) for ease of comparison.  Column (2) presents estimates 
from the model based only on individuals in households with policyholders earning 
between 50 and 150 percent of the wage base.  Narrowing in on the discontinuity leads to 
an increase in the point estimate of the coefficient of interest (to -1.280, statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level), although the standard errors are large enough that the 
estimate on the restricted sample is not statistically different from the estimate on the full 
sample.  Column (3) reports results from a model that omits everyone under age 18; the 
estimated effect changes hardly at all, although the standard error rises slightly.  Columns 
(4) and (5) report the effect of the tax preference on inpatient and outpatient spending 
separately; the fact that inpatient spending is less price-responsive than outpatient 
spending is consistent with the results from the RAND experiment and other work that 
suggests that inpatient spending is less discretionary.  Finally, columns (6) and (7) 
replicate the analysis on the earlier and the later five-year intervals covered by the 
sample, respectively.  Although the effect of the tax preference is not statistically 
significantly different from zero in the later subsample, it is of roughly the same 
magnitude in both as in the full, pooled sample.  A t-test of the difference between the 
two subsamples fails to reject that they are equal (p = 0.42). 
We estimated five other versions of (2) to investigate further the sensitivity of our 
results.  First, instead of narrowing the window around the discontinuity (as is 
conventional in regression discontinuity study designs), we estimated (2) using only 
observations that were distant from the discontinuity.  Excluding the 4,948 individuals   16
from families with a policyholder who earned 90-110 percent of the Social Security wage 
base leads to an estimated elasticity of -0.347 (standard error 0.477).
10  Second, to 
confirm that our result was not due to a few outliers, we excluded individuals with health 
spending over $100,000.  Excluding the 76 observations that met this condition, we 
estimate an elasticity of -0.728 (standard error 0.374).  Third, to investigate whether our 
results might be due to temporary health shocks and reverse causality (running from 
health status to income), we excluded individuals from families with a policyholder who 
switched from above to below (or below to above) the wage base in their two years in the 
MEPS panel.  Excluding these 5,494 observations, we estimate an elasticity of -0.750 
(with a standard error of 0.443).  Fourth, to investigate the possibility of reverse causality 
further, we reestimated the model using only family members other than the wage earner 
who holds the insurance policy.  Including only these 48,507 observations, we estimate 
an elasticity of -1.404 (standard error 0.463).  Fifth, we reestimated the model using 
placebo instruments that were 10 percent below and 10 percent above the true 
discontinuity.  Using these instruments, we estimate elasticities of -0.321 (standard error 
0.786) and -0.253 (standard error 0.576), respectively. 
We also investigated whether the tax price affects coverage, to explore the extent 
to which this channel might accentuate the effect of the tax price conditional on having 
coverage.  We estimated a model similar to (1), but on a sample of all employed people 
whether or not they had full-year employer-sponsored insurance (N = 111,139).  We used 
as the dependent variable the percentage of the year that the individual had coverage.  In 
                                                 
10 The fact that the estimated effect of the tax preferences is statistically insignificant based on observations 
that are distant from the Social Security wage base can be explained by two facts:  that the difference in 
Social Security tax rates above versus below the wage base is partially undone by differences in income tax 
rates, and that there is a positive income elasticity of demand for health insurance that is not fully captured 
by our regression specification.   17
elasticity terms, the instrumental variable estimate of the tax-price effect on coverage is -
0.096 (with a standard error of 0.041, significant at the 5 percent level).  We discuss the 
economic importance of this effect in Section VI below. 
 
V.  UNDERSTANDING THE MECHANISM THROUGH WHICH THE TAX 
EFFECT OCCURS  
  It is possible that our results could be generated by an unobserved process that is 
correlated with a threshold effect of policyholders' wage and salary income but not 
caused by tax incentives.  To investigate this concern, we test whether earning above 
versus below the Social Security tax threshold affects individuals' choice of insurance 
policy, as economic theory suggests that it should.  This choice may occur at the 
employer level, by affecting the set of plans that are offered, or at the employee level, by 
affecting the plan that is taken up.  In either event, if the estimated effect of the tax 
preference affects health spending by altering choice of insurance policy, then individuals 
with a greater tax subsidy should be covered by insurance that has higher premiums,
11 
and this effect should only occur for individuals whose premiums are paid with pre-tax 
dollars.
12  
To investigate whether this is true, we use data from the 1996-1998 Community 
Tracking Study (CTS).  The CTS consists of three surveys:  an Employer Survey, a 
                                                 
11 The premium for an insurance policy is identically related to the policy's generosity, as measured by its 
actuarial value.  Given that a policy's actuarial value, AV, is defined as the share of health spending that the 
policy would cover for the average person, its premiums is (1 + L) * AV * E(S), where E(S) is the expected 
spending of the policyholder(s) and L is the administrative cost, or load, of the insurance.  
12 Purchases of employer-sponsored health insurance can be made with pre-tax dollars under two 
conditions:  if the premiums are (nominally) paid by the employer, or if the premiums are paid by the 
employee through a Section 125, or "cafeteria," plan. However, premiums paid by employees (even 
through withheld salary) occur after-tax if the employer does not have a plan that qualifies under Section 
125 of the Internal Revenue Code.     18
Household Survey, and a Followback Survey.  The Employer Survey, conducted in 1997, 
collects information about the health insurance policies that the respondent employers 
provide (if any); the total premium per employee paid for single-person coverage, 
including both employee contributions and the amount paid by the employer on the 
employee's behalf; the share of the total premium that is paid by the employer on the 
employee's behalf; and employer characteristics (industry and firm size).  The Household 
Survey, administered in 1996-97, is a national sample of households that can be matched 
to the Followback Survey.  The Followback Survey, administered in 1997-98 to 
organizations that offered or administered private health insurance policies covering 
Household Survey respondents, collects detailed information on cost sharing, 
gatekeeping, and other characteristics of insurance policies (such as whether the policies 
are HMOs, PPOs, or point-of-service plans).  For each household with a respondent 
holding employer-sponsored health insurance, the matched Household/Followback 
Survey sample thus contains detailed characteristics of each respondent's health insurance 
policy, similar (although not identical) to the information collected by the Employer 
Survey; of each respondent household's insurance policyholder, including his or her wage 
and salary income, age, gender, and educational attainment; of each respondent 
household's insurance policyholder's firm (industry and firm size); and of each 
respondent household (household income and household size).  The variables from all 
three surveys are described in an Appendix (available from the authors). 
Ideally, to test whether the tax preference affects choice of insurance policy, we 
would know for each policyholder of employer-sponsored insurance, the wage and salary 
income of the policyholder, the generosity of the insurance policy, and the share of the   19
policy that was financed with pre-tax dollars.  However, although the matched 
Household/Followback Survey contains information on wage and salary income, it does 
not contain information on generosity, and none of the three surveys contains information 
on the tax status of payments for employer-sponsored health insurance.    
We approximate this ideal in the following way.  Using the Employer Survey, we 
run regressions of total premium per employee, Pk, and the share of premiums paid by the 
employer (for firms providing employer-sponsored health insurance), Sk, on the firm and 
insurance policy characteristics, Uk, where k = 1…K firms.  These regressions are of the 
following form: 
Pk = φ1Uk + εk 
Sk = φ2Uk + ηk . 
Then, we construct a vector of firm and insurance policy characteristics Uj for 
each individual j in the matched Household/Followback Survey who holds an employer-
sponsored insurance policy, where Uj is defined identically to Uk.  With this information, 
we calculate for each employer-sponsored insurance policyholder his or her predicted 
premium,  j U j P 1
ˆ ˆ   ,   and predicted share of premium paid by employer,  j U j S 2
ˆ ˆ   , 
using estimates of  φ1 and  φ2 from the Employer Survey.  Finally, using the matched 
Household/Followback Survey, we run regressions of predicted premiums on the 
characteristics of the insurance policyholder and his or her household listed in the 
appendix, Vj; polynominals in the policyholder's household income, Yj, and his or her 
wage and salary income ωj (expressed as a percentage of the 1997 Social Security wage 
base); and an indicator for whether the policyholder's wage and salary income was 
greater than 100 percent of the wage base, ABOVEj:   20
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where h(.), Yj, and ωj  are defined as they are in the health spending models.   We 
estimate this model on the full sample of all respondents with employer-sponsored 
insurance and on the half of the sample with above the median value for the predicted 
share of premium paid by employer (85 percent). 
Estimates of υ4 from this model, the effect of earning above the Social Security 
tax threshold on predicted premiums, are a lower bound on the effect on actual premiums.  
First, the estimate only captures the impact of the tax threshold on the portion of 
individuals' premiums that are correlated with their firm and insurance policy 
characteristics.  Second, using predicted premiums instead of actual premiums leads to 
conservative estimates because predicted premiums do not depend on any of the 
characteristics of individuals in the firm.   Therefore, by construction, estimates of the 
effect of the tax threshold on premiums obtained in this way cannot be due to any 
unobserved characteristics of individuals that may be correlated with wage and salary 
levels and health status. 
Selected parameter estimates from this model (and its logarithmic analog) are in 
Table 6.  The leftmost two columns of the table present results from the full sample.  
Holders of employer-sponsored insurance who earn above the Social Security threshold 
have lower predicted premiums, holding constant a polynomial in their wage and salary 
income, their household income, and their other characteristics, although this effect is not 
statistically significant.  The rightmost two columns present results from the half of the 
sample who, based on the characteristics of their insurance policy and their firm, have at   21
least 85 percent of their premium paid by their employers.  For individuals in this 
subsample, premiums are almost entirely paid out of pre-tax dollars.  The effect on 
predicted premiums of earning above the Social Security threshold is more negative and 
singificant at the 5 percent level.   
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  AND  IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
As health policy analysts have long observed, the tax preference for health 
insurance is likely a key cause of inefficiency in the U.S. health care system.  By making 
health spending in general, and insured health spending in particular, appear less costly 
than they are, the tax preference gives employees the incentive to take compensation as 
health insurance rather than cash -- even if the value of the spending to the employee is 
significantly less than its cost to society.  In this paper, we use a new identification 
strategy to estimate the magnitude of the tax preference's effect on health spending.  
Using the fact that Social Security taxes are only levied on earnings below a statutory 
threshold to identify exogenous variation in tax rates, we find a statistically and 
economically significant effect of the tax preference for insurance on spending.    
Our estimates of the tax-price elasticity of demand for health care spending of -
0.601 and -0.741, depending on specification, are squarely within the range reported in 
earlier work.  Gruber and Lettau (2004), for example, find an elasticity of firm-level 
insurance spending with respect to the tax price of -0.7; Smart and Stabile (2005) find 
tax-price elasticities of the demand for health services in the range of -0.7 to -1.0.  The 
fact that our estimates, derived using a very different method than earlier work, are in the   22
same range should give health policy analysts greater confidence that the true effect lies 
in this range. 
The elasticities in Table 4 can be used to simulate how much health spending by 
privately-insured individuals would fall if the tax preference were repealed.  Given that 
the average federal marginal tax rate (including Social Security and Medicare taxes) in 
our sample is 35.9 percent (authors' unpublished calculation), repealing the tax preference 
would increase the after-tax price of insured expenditures from 0.641p to p, where p is 
the before-tax price of health care.  Evaluated at the average after-tax price, this amounts 
to a 43.8 percent price increase (=0.359p / (0.5*(0.641p + p)).  At an elasticity of -0.601 
(table 4, column (3)), this increase translates into a 26.3 percent decrease in health 
spending; at an elasticity of -0.741 (Table 4, column (4)), this increase translates into a 
32.5 percent decrease (1.002*0.438) in health spending. 
These effects, while quite large, are consistent with the results from other 
simulation models, including our own work.   Among individuals with nonzero health 
spending in our sample, the average coinsurance rate, as measured by the share of health 
spending that is out-of-pocket, is 32.3 percent.  According to Jack and Sheiner (Table 2, 
1997), at a tax preference for insurance of 32.8 percent, an effective coinsurance rate of 
this magnitude implies a coefficient of relative risk aversion of approximately 1.5.  At a 
coefficient of relative risk aversion of 1.5, repealing the tax preference in their model 
leads to an approximate doubling of the coinsurance rate; this result is similar to the 
effect of the tax preference simulated by Feldstein and Friedman (1977).  A doubling of 
the coinsurance rate from 32 to 64 percent, in turn, would lead to a decline in health 
spending of between 13.3 percent (at the RAND experiment's estimate of the elasticity of   23
demand for health services of -0.2) and 46.7 percent (at Eichner's (1998) elasticity of 
demand for health services of -0.7).
13   Gruber (Table 5, 2002) reports that removing all 
tax subsidies for health insurance would result in a 35.4 percent decline in health 
spending among individuals who are offered insurance by their employer, expressed as a 
percentage point change from its initial value.  Expressed as a percentage-point change at 
the average (in order to make his estimate comparable to the others), this difference 
amounts to a 43.0 percent decline in health spending.
 14 
Simulations of the effect of repealing the tax preference based on our empirical 
elasticity estimates, however, may either overstate or understate the true effect.  On the 
one hand, if spending becomes less responsive as the tax preference is phased out and the 
level of spending is reduced, then the effects of repeal will be smaller than observational 
data would predict.  On the other hand, a nationwide change in tax policy may lead to a 
larger change in coinsurance rates and health spending than observational data based on 
small differences in marginal tax rates would predict.  Amy Finkelstein (2007), for 
example, shows that the change in hospital spending associated with the introduction of 
Medicare was far greater than the elasticities from the RAND Experiment would have 
predicted.  In addition, our estimates are based on the elasticity of behavior of individuals 
at the upper end of the income distribution (i.e., around the Social Security threshold); the 
elasticity at the mean income may be either larger or smaller. 
Our estimates of the effect of the tax preference on coverage are quite modest, 
consistent with the findings of other work (Gruber and Washington, 2005).  As discussed 
above in Section IV, the elasticity of the number of days of insurance coverage with 
                                                 
13 That is, 0.133 = 0.2*(0.32 / (0.5*(0.32+0.64))) and 0.467 = 0.7*(0.32 / (0.5*(0.32+0.64))). 
14 That is, 0.43 = (0.354 / (.5*(0.354+(1-0.354)))).   24
respect to TP is -0.096 in this population, which means that even complete repeal of the 
tax preference would lead to only a 4.2 percent decrease in the number of covered days;
15 
at an average coverage rate of 92 percent, this translates into a decrease of 14 days 
(authors' unpublished calculation).  This finding has two implications.  First, subject to 
the caveats above, it implies that repealing the tax preference would likely have little 
effect on coverage for the full-year employed population that is the subject of our study.  
Second, it implies very small consequences for health spending.  Using the estimates of 
the effect of coverage on health spending from Jack Hadley et al. (2008), decreasing 
coverage by 14 days would decrease expenditures by around $85 per year per person, or 
approximately 2 percent.
16     
  Future work might seek to investigate the effect of the tax preference on health 
outcomes.  The RAND Experiment found no significant effect of the tax preference on 
insurance generosity for the average adult, which, combined with our estimates, would 
suggest that the tax preference for insurance leads to massive inefficiency in the 
allocation of resources.  However, the RAND Experiment did find some effects of health 
spending for vulnerable subpopulations, and in any event is now based on medical 
technology that is considerably out-of-date.  Without better information about how health 
spending currently affects health, translating the findings of this paper into implications 
for social welfare must necessarily be left to future research. 
                                                 
15 From above, repeal of the tax preference represents a 43.8 percent increase in TP , which implies a 4.2 
percent decrease in the number of covered days because -0.042 = 0.438 * -0.096. 
16 Hadley et al. (2008) calculate that spending per year for a full-year insured person is $3,915, or $10.73 
per day; spending per year for a full-year uninsured person is $1,686, or $4.62 per day.  Thus, decreasing a 
person's coverage by 14 days would lead to a decline in spending of $85 = 14*($10.73 - $4.62), or 2.4 
percent on a base of $3,593 (= $3,915*(335/365)).    25
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 Figure 1 
Distribution of spending by type and by quntile, 1996-2005 
(Individuals in families with insurance policyholder earning 90-100 percent and 100-110 
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Table 2   
Average health spending (2004 $) of individuals in families with a full-year employed 
worker and full-year employer insurance coverage, 1996-2005 
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Note:  Averages calculated using MEPS sample weights.     30
 Table 3 
Characteristics of families and individuals, 
families with a full-year employed worker and full-year employer insurance coverage, 
1996-2005, by wage and salary income of insurance policyholder  
 
  Wage/salary income of policyholder is… 
  90-100% of wage 
base 
100-110% of wage 
base 
    
Family characteristics     






    
   Tax price of insurance  0.597  0.692 
 (0.024)  (0.023) 
    
   Education  15.197  15.349 
 (1.997)  (2.008) 
    
   Occupation: managerial/technical  0.690  0.691 
    
   Industry: financial services  0.264  0.268 
    
   Industry: manufacturing 0.230  0.247 
    
   Industry: construction  0.043  0.046 
    
   Industry: agriculture/mining  0.007  0.007 
      
   Industry: public administration  0.100  0.093 
    
Individual characteristics     
   Age   31.934  31.812 
 (17.874)  (17.658) 
    
   Female gender  0.465  0.471 
    
   Married  0.504  0.501 
    
   Number of observations  2,977  1,971 
 
Notes:  Averages calculated using MEPS sample weights.  Family education, occupation, 
and industry are defined to be those of its policyholder.   31
Table 4 
Effect on health spending (2004 $) of the after-tax price of insurance,families with a full-
year employed worker and full-year employer-sponsored insurance 
  
Spending ln(spending) Spending ln(spending)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax price of insurance
   TP 704 -1794 *
(491) (1064)
   ln(TP) -0.044 -0.741 **
(0.174) (0.374)
Effect of wage/salary income of policyholder
   Percentage of Social Security wage base -551 ** 0.209 -731 ** 0.134
(279) (0.158) (306) (0.166)
   (Percentage of Social Security wage base)^2 437 * -0.168 714 ** -0.065
(233) (0.131) (295) (0.149)
   (Percentage of Social Security wage base)^3 -67 0.026 -125 0.006
(62) (0.034) (82) (0.040)
Effect of household income
   Income x 10^-4 153 *** 72
(35) (44)
   Income^2 x 10^-9 -104 *** -69 **
(25) (27)
   Income^3 x 10^-15   183 *** 131 **
(50) (53)
Ln(income) 0.411 *** 0.329 ***
(0.036) (0.053)
Estimator OLS OLS IV IV
Number of (person-year) observations 96,805 96,805 96,805 96,805




Notes:  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors allowing for within-family correlation are in 
parentheses.  One observation is one individual; observations are weighted using MEPS 
sample weights.  Education, occupation, and industry are defined to be those of the 
policyholder.  Estimated by instrumental variables, excluded instrument for tax rate is 
whether wage/salary income of primary worker is greater than 100 percent of the wage 
base.   Table 5 
Effect on health spending (2004 $) of the after-tax price of insurance, alternative models 
 
After-tax price of insurance
   ln(TP) -0.741 ** -1.280 ** -0.739 * -0.026 -0.774 ** -1.268 ** -0.689
(0.374) (0.580) (0.435) (0.251) (0.367) (0.515) (0.508)
Effect of family income
   ln(income)  0.329 *** 0.040 0.268 *** -0.089 *** 0.342 *** 0.253 *** 0.365 ***
(0.053) (0.102) (0.059) (0.034) (0.052) (0.071) (0.074)
Exclusions from sample
Number of observations 96,805 37,262 69,931 96,805 96,805 43,254 53,551
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Notes: See notes to Table 4.  All specifications are based on model (3) from Table 4 with the listed changes.  In regression 
models but not reported in the table are coefficients on year, age, gender, marital status, family size, education, industry, and 
occupation.   33
Table 6 
Effect on monthly employer-sponsored predicted insurance premiums (1997 $) of earning 
above versus below the Social Security wage base, full sample and individuals with at least 
85 percent of premiums paid by their employer 
 
Premiums ln(Premiums) Premiums ln(Premiums)
Effect of wage/salary income of policyholder
   Indicator for above 100% of  -1.90 -0.014 -4.09 ** -0.027 **
   Social Security wage base (1.50) (0.010) (1.97) (0.014)
   Percentage of Social Security wage base 8.90 0.112 *** -8.58 0.008
(5.42) (0.034) (7.25) (0.048)
   (Percentage of Social Security wage base)^2 -14.07 ** -0.138 *** 1.81 -0.046
(6.13) (0.039) (8.06) (0.054)
   (Percentage of Social Security wage base)^3 4.14 ** 0.036 *** -0.02 0.011
(1.72) (0.011) (2.23) (0.015)
Effect of household income
   Income x 10^-5 13.30 ** 11.20
(6.64) (9.04)
   Income^2 x 10^-10 -3.20 0.49
(10.00) (13.40)
   Income^3 x 10^-15 -2.50 -5.00
(4.29) (5.70)
Ln(income) 0.010 *** 0.008 **
(0.003) (0.004)
Number of observations 12,498 12,498 6,887 6,887
Dependent Variable
Full Sample
Sample with >85% Premium 
Employer-Paid
 
Notes:  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  One observation is one 
employer-sponsored-insurance policyholder.  Based on matched Household and Followback 
Survey data from the 1996-1998 Community Tracking Study.  Predicted premiums and the 
percentage of predicted premiums paid by the employer imputed based on the characteristics of 
the policyholder's insurance policy and the policyholder's employer (industry and firm size).  In 
regressions but not reported in table are age fixed effects, CTS site fixed effects (approximately 
equal to MSA fixed effects), and coefficients on gender, marital status, family size, and 
education. 
 